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Mr. Trifilidis: I find the Weiner and Wright paper very interesting and
very well done. But I found a missing point, and a very important missing
point—that is, entry has different consequences. The first consequence I call
the “multilateral interchange fee” just to remember that it is a price-fixing
agreement between banks. It could be a coercive or cooperative agreement,
but for sure it is an agreement. Another consequence that was addressed in
the paper, but not in the presentation of the conference, was about public
authorities and looks at the central bank and antitrust authority as if they
have the same job. They do not. The types of jobs they do are completely dif-
ferent. The consequence is the same. As an antitrust authority, and also as a
commissioner for the Bank of Italy, I find agreements on an interchange fee
to be like agreements that are restrictive of the competition. So, if I accept
them and authorize them for a little while from a bank commissioner point
of view, I may find them illegal from an antitrust point of view.
The final consequence is the main problem of collecting data. My results
are proper if we should keep the interchange fee forever, or before a letter and
antitrust authority will prohibit it, so we should see which way the system
could work with that. 
Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell: I found both presentations very interesting. The
ability to change interchange fees depends very much on banks or issuers act-
ing collectively. Would the more liberal licensing policy change anything in
this situation or not? Or is it so expensive to set up a separate network that
it will not happen?
Mr. Frankel: I guess I didn’t understand the question. A separate new network?
Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell: Does the ability, for instance, to increase inter-
change fees here in the United States depend on issuers acting collectively?
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 Mr. Frankel: The interchange fee is set collectively. My view is that their
ability to increase that profitably increases; as merchants and consumers get
more dependent on cards, their market power increases. 
Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell: But why are there no alternative suppliers of these
services? Is it too expensive to set up a network in the country, or what is the
reason for it?
Mr. Frankel: There are competing systems, but a good example is the 
difference between a PIN debit network here, which used to have no inter-
change fees—it was essentially a par collection system on PIN debit in the
United States—versus signature debit. I am sure Lloyd Constantine will be
telling you what happens in that environment, because consumers are 
getting an incentive to use their signature debit, which is a more expensive
system to merchants and a less efficient system (most people would agree).
They may be paying a fee to use their PIN debit card. It is giving consumers
an incentive to choose the more expensive system. 
So just having a cheaper or more efficient system isn’t enough. The answer
that I have heard from some is, “The answer is simple: The PIN debit 
networks should compete better by raising their interchange fees.”
I suggest that is simply everyone moving toward the monopoly fee. 
Mr. Weiner: I guess my view is somewhat different in the sense that the
United States is a very dynamic market and there is a lot of change. Some
would question whether the direction of interchange movements right now
is consistent with this or that theory and this or that business model and
who benefits. Alan Frankel obviously has one view. 
I want to emphasize that Julian Wright and I, at the end of the paper,
remain agnostic on exactly what is going on in the U.S. market, because
frankly we don’t feel we have sufficient information. But I appreciate Alan’s
insight, thoughts, and comments. This goes to the first gentleman’s ques-
tion as well. This whole notion of how fees are set is central to the inter-
change issue. It is very easy to look at what is called collective fee setting
and say, “That’s monopolistic.”
That may or may not be true. One thought I would leave you with is that
the market structure implications in two-sided markets aren’t necessarily the
same as the market structure implications in standard one-sided markets.
When we see monopolistic and oligopolistic behavior in single-standard
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 markets, we think we understand that. I would add also, we have ample
empirical data to help us understand it. 
In two-sided markets, I am not convinced that we know exactly what the
implications of various market structures are. There is a much deeper, funda-
mental question here. 
Mr. Rochet: I would like to respond briefly to Alan’s comments, particular-
ly since he kindly cited my work with Tirole. However, I think the citations
should be qualified a little bit, in particular when you said that multiple net-
works simply might replicate the monopoly outcome. This is what you call
dysfunctional competition. The word might is important, because the result,
as you remember, holds only in a very peculiar case, in particular under the
assumption that consumers hold only one type of card, which I don’t think is
relevant for the case of the United States.
The other remark is that what you call the monopoly platform outcome is
not necessarily bad for social welfare. It would be true if we had a monopoly
proprietary system. But, if you have even a unique association or a duopoly of
associations, then the outcome is not necessarily bad because there is compe-
tition between the members of the association on both sides of the market.
The other citation of my work that you are using is, and I quote, “Privately
optimal interchange fees are at the maximum level that is acceptable for mer-
chants.” Again, this is true under very peculiar assumptions. In particular,
you need to have market power only on the issuer side, which is the assump-
tion that we made initially in my paper with Tirole, and no competition
between platforms. It is really a theoretical result, and it is probably not
applicable as such in any country.
Mr. Frankel: If I didn’t make it clear, when I was saying I am picking a
particular scenario that I believe to be reflective of the way the markets actu-
ally work, I mean that I will extend on my selective citations of Mr. Rochet’s
work as well. I didn’t mean to imply that those were the only possibilities he
discussed. I happen to think, though, that with respect to consumers hold-
ing one card—the single-homing versus the multihoming point—merchants
do behave as if consumers have one card. If you talk to merchants, I think
they will tell you they can’t afford to drop particular cards. This is especially
true of Visa and MasterCard. 
I looked at your slides, to jump way ahead now. You cite Reisen’s statisti-
cal work. I looked at that last night. It was very interesting. If you look at the
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States will also have a Discover card or American Express card, as I recall, it
is in the range of 35 to 40 percent. If you look in the other direction, if a
consumer has an American Express card or Discover card, the probability
they’ll also have a Visa or MasterCard is over 90 percent. Right now, even if
a merchant might be able to afford to drop an American Express card or
Discover card, I don’t think they can afford to drop a Visa or MasterCard in
the same way.
Ms. Litan: I thought the Weiner and Wright paper was really instrumental
in educating me. As you point out, Stu, the weakness is that you didn’t have
enough data. As a researcher, data are critical to what I do too. Can you talk
about why it was so difficult for you to get the data? I just don’t quite under-
stand that. And how do you propose to resolve that?
Mr. Weiner: I don’t have a proposal to resolve it necessarily. There are
actually two levels of data that we needed to generate for this paper. One
was simply to construct what is going on in these countries. That is what
appears in the tables, basically. It is kind of a snapshot of the various inter-
change fee arrangements, how they are set, who the networks are, what
instruments there are, and what various network rules are in place. Where 
possible, we tried to get a sense of whether interchange fees, consumer fees,
and merchant service charges have been declining, rising, and so on. 
That in itself was somewhat ambitious because the data are not in any
one place. It is difficult to even get that snapshot information. Many of you
who work in this industry know how complex pricing tiers are and things
like that. We felt we were fairly successful that, again with the assistance of
many people in this room, we were at least able to get a sense of where
these countries are. 
I would argue the real data needs are at the second level, that is, when
doing serious econometric work. There, one is going to need significant time
series data on interchange fees, consumer fees, merchant service charge fees,
degree of pass-through, all of these kinds of things that are in these models
and that need to be rigorously measured. Those data, we believe, are out
there. We have to believe that merchants have some of those data. Clearly,
the networks know what fees they are charging. How one gathers that, I don’t
know. Nor would you expect a firm to release proprietary information that
could somehow damage their competitive standing, but there are a lot of eco-
nomic data in a lot of other sectors of this nature that is made available. 
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 One of Julian and my pleas is to somehow start thinking about sharing
this information, where feasible, and it will better inform all of us.
Ultimately, we think it will lead to better public policy. It is a difficult ques-
tion, Avivah. As a researcher, you know when one is in a position of being
asked to make policy recommendations, you want to be relying not just on
theory but on hard empirical work. Without the data, that is very difficult
to do.
Mr. Frankel: If I could, I would like to add that even where some regula-
tors have issued reports—such as the European Commission—they have
often redacted as sensitive business secrets some of Visa’s information about
the level of their fees or costs, or the process by which fees are determined. 
Mr. Brouwer: Maybe, if we are sharing all this information with institu-
tions all over the world, you need to structure for interchange fees as well. 
Mr. Orenbuch: I was wondering, primarily of Alan, if you could, in the
context of the U.S. experience, discuss a couple of issues, as it doesn’t seem
that anyone really has discussed them.
It really seems to me that there are two separate issues. One is the level of
the discount that merchants are being charged. The other is the form at
which and way in which the interchange piece is set. You also have two other
examples. You have stand-alone issuers that are now developing as networks
in the United States—American Express and Discover—which are not dis-
cussed in virtually any of the literature about the United States or elsewhere.
American Express has the highest level of that discount. Discover, recently in
a discussion that we had with them, indicated they were raising it (they
believed, anyway) faster than any of the other networks. Both of them have
signed network agreements in the United States recently. Layering on the
point you made about cardholders in the United States who have an
American Express card and virtually all of them having a Visa or MasterCard,
why is that a tenable proposition? And why isn’t the solution just for mer-
chants to say, “No mas?”
Mr. Frankel: That is a great question. Let me answer that in two ways.
One, AmEx is often held out by interchange fee defenders as a prototypical,
competitive player that they should be able to emulate. I suggest that AmEx,
instead, has unilateral market power and a collective of all the banks in the
country should not emulate that structure. 
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fees are constrained as much as they are by Visa and MasterCard is because
AmEx wanted to get penetration throughout a broader merchant sector, and
because of the situation in which merchants are a little bit more comfortable
throwing out AmEx if the fees get too high. You see in Australia where even
AmEx had to cut its fee—not a lot, but a little bit—in response to the Visa
and MasterCard fee reductions. What will happen as a result of the
Department of Justice case is there will be potentially less and less distinction
among these three- and four-party systems, so that maybe at some point in
the future, I won’t be able to say with as much confidence that a merchant
could throw out AmEx and not lose as many sales as they will today by drop-
ping MasterCard or Visa. 
Even today, they find they really can’t throw out AmEx. There is a public
discussion of Walgreens temporarily canceling AmEx. It would be really
interesting to know what their experience was, if they are willing to share. In
the future, it will be harder and harder if AmEx continues to increase its 
penetration among cardholders and merchants. More consumers will rely
exclusively on their AmEx card.
Mr. Posner: Mr. Weiner, in your paper, you conclude that you are agnos-
tic, not having sufficient theory or data to prove one hypothesis or another.
Of course, no theory or no amount of data will even allow any of us to prove
anything conclusively, so we must approach this interesting controversial
subject with conjectures. 
Alan has outlined a conjecture that the fact pattern in the United States of
increasing interchange rates is consistent with a race to the monopoly price.
My question is, what is the most credible counterhypothesis to Alan’s to
explain what is going on in the United States?
Mr. Weiner: I am uncomfortable getting into the most likely counterpro-
posal. On my part, it would be conjecture. Julian and I were comfortable
raising that as a possibility. Certainly, it is one scenario that, even if we don’t
agree with it, we were comfortable enough at least with suggesting it in the
paper. We suggested others as well, none of which we are going to hang our
hat on. 
You pointed out that we really are never going to have a conclusive answer.
That is absolutely true. I would argue that we are never going to have it clear-
ly on theory alone. Theories can spin out all kinds of implications and sce-
narios. They are very, very useful. But the way real policy and real action are
taken, of course, is to take that theory and then apply the data to it. I admire
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 Alan and thank him for taking this one scenario and pushing it, because I
think it is one we are hearing a lot of in the United States. I anticipate we are
going to hear a lot more of it over the next day and a half of this conference.
Maybe by the end of the next day and a half, I, in fact, will be more con-
vinced myself with more information and with more data. At this point, that
is as far as I am willing to go, but it is exactly this kind of dialogue that we
need. In the end—and I hate to keep saying it—we are going to need to
know from both ends of the market with all the different players where exact-
ly the numbers are and what is driving some of this behavior. Again, I want
to take issue with this language that is appearing about the drive toward the
monopolistic price. It is not at all clear, from a theoretical standpoint, that is
what is happening in U.S. markets or any other markets. I would be very
uncomfortable saying it is a drive to monopolistic price. We don’t know
enough about two-sided markets, even theoretically, to know necessarily
what a monopolistic price looks like.
Mr. Roylance: A question for Stu Weiner. In your paper, you haven’t made
any discussion about access issues. I raise that because in our Australian situ-
ation, as you know, the payments system board, which is also represented
here, has placed some significant emphasis on opening up access to our 
credit card associations. And now they are working on opening access to our
PIN debit system as well, the objective being to allow new competitors
entrance into the market, particularly in the acquiring side; to allow new
acquirers to enter the market; and to allow organizations to be specialist
acquirers—not issuers—to bring some more balance into the internal 
operations of the associations that are typically issuer-denominated. Also, it
will allow large merchants to function within the payments environment as
self-acquirers. I wondered if you think that is of interest to you or if it could
be important in the U.S. context?
Mr. Weiner: Yes, it is absolutely important and thank you for raising it.
It was something that Julian and I really could not get our arms around,
certainly for all the countries at which we looked. Our view—and I know
I can speak for Julian—is that clearly nonbank participation in the various
areas of the payments system, all else equal, should enhance competition.
Whether it is a one-sided or two-sided market, the more competitors you
have, all else equal, that should be a good thing for efficiency and compe-
tition. In some countries, and the United States is among them, we have a
fair number of nonbank participants as acquirers and throughout the pay-
ments process. We will probably get into this in later sessions, but there are 
several ways to think about regulation and pricing caps and so on. Perhaps
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in fact, to relax restrictive rules and/or ease barriers to entry. This is one
area where nonbanks can clearly do both. That is a very good point.
Mr. Burns: I’ll echo Stu’s comment that it is probably best to be somewhat
agnostic, even when we are talking about saints (this is getting to be a very
religious discussion, as I think about it). I want to make a comment that
hopefully may be helpful to discussions throughout the next day and a half.
I was listening to this discussion and reading the literature, and I find that
we get to this particular focus on an aspect of this business called interchange
of pricing mechanism. It is also useful to keep in mind the larger context of
what is going on in these payments instruments. For example, in the United
States, if we look at the tremendous growth of electronic payments—debit,
credit, and so forth—the much broader access of various population seg-
ments to credit and electronic payment mechanisms, innovations have taken
place. Everybody is talking about prepaid and what not. Somehow it seems
to me that all of those industry characteristics have to be taken into account
when we start talking about the business end. We run a little bit of a danger
getting too narrowly focused on one aspect. Having said that, it is important
work, an important discussion, and certainly relevant, but there are other
aspects that we ought to take into consideration as well. My point is that I
don’t know where interchange fits into all the rest of the stuff or not. I just
know that you observe the growth, sophistication, and complexity of the
industry. That is an important aspect and a social good.
Mr. Brouwer: As Stu already pointed out, even to understand interchange
fees, you must understand the wider fields and the other instruments. 
Mr. Frankel: What occurs to me is the Fed economists and officials are
being very diplomatic. In 1914, the Fed began a long effort to quash inter-
change fees on checks. They were absolutely certain that was a noble effort
for a long time. I think at some point, it makes sense for the Fed to reach
conclusions on this point. It will be very helpful.
Mr. Weiner: I think I will remain diplomatic.
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